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IS IT TIME TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION?
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION
JAMES E. FLEMING*
INTRODUCTION
Is it time to rewrite the Constitution? We should break this question
down into two parts: (1) Is it time to rewrite the Constitution by adopting
particular amendments?, and (2) Is it time to throw out the Constitution
and write a new one through holding a constitutional convention, as
Sandy Levinson has urged?1
A further question is to what extent does the Constitution, and our
constitutional practice under it, already permit or require “rewriting” as
we build out our framework of constitutional self-government over time?
Despite claims by some originalists that the formal amending procedures
of Article V are the exclusive legitimate means for changing the
Constitution, living constitutionalists like David Strauss and Bruce
Ackerman have gone so far as to argue that formal constitutional
amendments are largely irrelevant to such change. Strauss argues that
common law constitutional interpretation, not amendment through the
formal procedures of Article V, has been our primary means for
constitutional change.2 Ackerman argues that the six-phase higher
lawmaking procedures outside Article V that he elaborates have been the
primary means whereby We the People have “hammered out” such
changes.3 To the extent that living constitutionalists like Strauss and
Ackerman are right, perhaps we do not need formally to rewrite the
Constitution to realize constitutional change. Perhaps we already do well
enough through “rewriting” it informally.
For that very reason, conservatives and libertarians like Richard
Epstein have bemoaned that progressives already have “rewritten” the
Constitution, expanding governmental powers and eviscerating economic
*
Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar
in Law, and Associate Dean for Research and Intellectual Life, Boston University School
of Law. I prepared the longer paper from which this essay is excerpted for the Wisconsin
Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy Symposium, “Is It Time to Rewrite the
Constitution,” November 7-8, 2014. Thanks to my research assistant Michael Dimaio for
helpful comments.
1.
SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
2.
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
3.
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(2014).
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liberties.4 Similarly, conservative originalists like Robert Bork and
Antonin Scalia have complained that liberals already have “rewritten”
the Constitution, reading “unenumerated” personal liberties into it.5 And
libertarian originalists like Randy Barnett have called for “restoring the
lost Constitution” by undoing the progressive and liberal “redactions.”6
This Essay is part of my book in progress, Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution,7 in which I reject all forms of originalism and recast the
best forms of living constitutionalism. Instead, I defend what Ronald
Dworkin has called a “moral reading” of the American Constitution8 and
what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to
constitutional interpretation.9 By “moral reading” and “philosophic
approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying
abstract moral and political principles, not codifying concrete historical
rules or practices, and of interpretation of those principles as requiring
normative judgments about how they are best understood, not merely
historical research to discover relatively specific original meanings. I
argue that the moral reading, not any version of originalism or living
constitutionalism, is the most faithful to the Constitution’s commitments.
In my book, Securing Constitutional Democracy, I characterize my
approach as a “Constitution-perfecting theory” (my term) under which
we should interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be
(Dworkin’s formulation).10 That is not to say that we should interpret it
as a perfect Constitution. Rather, whatever imperfections our
Constitution and our constitutional practice under it may have, we should
interpret it in its best light. Constitution-perfecting approaches like
Dworkin’s and mine, while not interpreting the Constitution to make it
perfect, nonetheless mitigate some of its imperfections by aiming for

4.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION
(2006).
5.
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
6.
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004).
7.
JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR
MORAL READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
8.
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2–3 (1996).
9.
SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS, at xiii, 155 (2007).
10.
JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF
AUTONOMY (2006).
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what Levinson has called “happy endings.”11 Furthermore, we adopt and
strive to maintain an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution.
Proponents of views like Dworkin’s and mine may be less ready
than some others to argue that we should rewrite the Constitution as a
whole—to throw out the Constitution and adopt a new one. This
notwithstanding the fact that we recognize many imperfections in our
Constitution and constitutional practice. We also may be less likely than
some others to argue for adopting a number of specific constitutional
amendments.
But even under a Constitution-perfecting theory, and even with an
attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, we might conclude that
it is time to rewrite the Constitution in certain circumstances. And so, let
us return to the opening question: Is it time to rewrite the Constitution?
The answer depends upon our judgments concerning: (1) whether the
Constitution has failed, (2) whether it has contributed to incorrigible
breakdown or dysfunction, (3) whether it is irredeemably undemocratic
or unjust, and (4) whether the prospects for reform and improvement
through rewriting the Constitution are good. In my fuller paper, which
will be a chapter in my book, I address such issues.
I. STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION
In confronting (real or arguable) constitutional failure, dysfunction,
democratic deficits, and injustice, we need strategies for responding to
imperfection (to recall the title of a book edited by Levinson).12 These
strategies may include convening a constitutional convention or adopting
specific formal constitutional amendments through the procedures of
Article V. But, I argue for less formal strategies: (1) developing informal
constitutional amendments over time (e.g., through Strauss-style
common law constitutional interpretation or Ackerman-style higher
lawmaking outside the procedures of Article V); (2) interpreting the
Constitution so as to make it the best it can be (Dworkin’s moral reading)
or to redeem its promises (Balkin’s living originalism); and (3) working
around imperfections through what I have called “successful failures,”
whereby the features of a Constitution fail to work as contemplated or
designed, but we comprehend that that failure turns out to be a good
thing.
Under these strategies for responding to imperfection, we adopt and
strive to maintain an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution. We
11.
See Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1358 (1997)
(statement of Sanford Levinson).
12.
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed.,1995).
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conceive the Constitution as a framework of general powers and abstract
rights, as an instrument for pursuing the ends proclaimed in the
preamble, as an instrument for redeeming its promises. (Here I
deliberately echo and invoke the work of Barber and Balkin.) We
approach the Constitution as an “experiment” in constitutional
self-government, a scheme to be built out (Balkin) or hammered out
(Ackerman) over time, not a fully finished structure to begin with. We
appreciate that the building is never complete—that the Constitution
“will always be building,” as Charles Black put it.13
As discussed above, Levinson’s response to dysfunction and the
democratic deficit (as he sees it) is to call for rewriting the Constitution
through holding a constitutional convention.14 My response to such
imperfections—beyond arguing for applying a Constitution-perfecting
theory, with an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution—is to
call for “rewriting” the constitutional culture, as it were. For a muscular
argument along these lines, read Barber’s important and provocative new
book, Constitutional Failure.15 Barber goes so far as to argue that the
Constitution has failed—or is in danger of failing—not because of the
institutional failure that Levinson and others have lamented, but because
of “attitudinal” failure.16 Barber forcefully argues that Madison’s strategy
of supplying the defects of better motives through checks and balances
and relying upon private incentives—rather than through cultivating the
virtues and attitudes in citizens that are necessary for successful
constitutional self-government—has failed.17 I have addressed such
matters in my book with Linda McClain, Ordered Liberty: Rights,
Responsibilities, and Virtues.18 There we argue for a “mild
perfectionism,” a formative project of inculcating civic virtues and
cultivating the capacities required for constitutional self-government.19
Like Barber, I would argue that it is in virtues, attitudes, and capacities,
not in the “hard-wired features” of the Constitution as such, where the
greatest failures of our constitutional order lie. Barber cites our book as
among those sources offering some hope for American constitutionalism

13.
Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in 1
THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT 337, 343 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989).
14.
See LEVINSON, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15.
SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE (2014).
16.
Id. at 24.
17.
BARBER, supra note 15.
18.
JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013).
19.
Id.
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(despite what he sees all around as the evidence of constitutional
failure).20
Here I would make two further points. One, we may not be able to
rewrite the Constitution successfully without “rewriting” the
constitutional culture to begin with—otherwise, good proposals most
likely would fail to be made or even if made, would fail to be adopted.
Second, once we “rewrite” our constitutional culture—so as more
effectively to inculcate the civic virtues and capacities necessary for
successful constitutional self-government—we may not need to rewrite
the Constitution, whether by specific amendments or a constitutional
convention. Instead, applying a Constitution-perfecting theory, with an
attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, we might be able to do
well enough by interpreting the Constitution we have so as to make it the
best it can be.
At the same time, if we take the view that “the preeminent
constitutional virtue is not fidelity to a given constitution but the moral
and intellectual capacity to make and reform constitutions”—as Barber,
invoking Murphy, has argued in Constitutional Failure21—we might
more readily conclude that we should rewrite the Constitution. Or at any
rate that we should “rewrite” the constitutional culture in order to
cultivate liberal virtues (as Stephen Macedo has argued)22 and foster the
capacities for constitutional self-government (as McClain and I have
argued).23 These virtues and capacities may be necessary to “supply the
defect of better motives”—contrary to Madison’s strategy of checks and
balances and private incentives—if we are to attain or maintain a
Constitution that would be worthy of our fidelity.

20.
BARBER, supra note 15, at 142 & n.51 (citing FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra
note 18, at 4–11, 54–68, 87–91. 113–21).
21.
Id. at 111 & n.1 (citing WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:
CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER 15–16 (2007)).
22.
STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP,
VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990);
23.
See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 18.

